

Public Personnel Reform in Pakistan: Clashing of Ideas

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The civil service in Pakistan, which was bred in the British imperial tradition, has to grapple with problems confronting Muslim communities such as differences among competing religious groups, racial prejudices and the social caste system. The continuing powerlessness of the poor and the disadvantaged, rampant discourtesy, unsatisfactory public service and elitism count among the major criticisms hurled at the Pakistani bureaucracy. Despite radical efforts to reform the civil service, the establishmentarian personnel system was essentially preserved and even grew stronger. Measures which have been more effective in gradually shaping the civil service have been identified as: (1) maintenance of institutions for public service training; (2) employment of quotas and ethnic preferences; (3) rationalization between technocrats and generalists in staffing key positions, (4) provision for lateral appointment and movement of personnel; and (5) establishment of the Unified National Pay Scale.

Introduction

Pakistan was born out of communal phobia. The Muslim minority, although sizeable in numbers and concentrated in strategic territories, feared living in a new nation-state dominated by secularist Hindus (Stephens 1966:Chapter 1; Symonds 1949:Part I). For over two centuries Muslim communities were sapped by invidious conflicts: differences of competing religious groups, racial prejudices of white and brown, struggles of caste and outcast. Behind these controversies was the even more emotional issue of culture and civilization, or fundamentals governing life. Included here were modes of thought, basic assumptions, norms of behavior, and codes of values. India has no common heritage such as the Western

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World derived from Greeks, Romans and Jews (Spear 1967:11-26). Its historic subcontinent has long been characterized by virulent socio-religious variations and violent contrasts. V.S. Naipaul captured the contrariety, with its incessant splinterings, disintegration and rejuvenation, in the title of his recent book: *A Million Million Mutinies Now* (1990).¹

Following the Indian Mutiny of 1857 (sometimes termed by the nationals of the subcontinent as the War of Independence or the Great Revolt), the British Raj with remarkable effort arrested fissiparous tendencies. For the only time in history, the subcontinent was consolidated under one governmental authority. Until the beginning of World War II, it was difficult to fault this administrative state. It accomplished "good works," in spite of its imperial being.

The British Raj was conceived in the terms of "three arms": "criminal justice" (law and order), the treasury (assessment and collection of revenue), and the army (imperial power) (Tinker 1962:151). In structure this triune system was essentially a product of Mughal history (Qureshi 1966 and Dabashi 1988). It was British in ethos, by its subordination of the military to civil authority. The operation of the administrative state was tempered by a free and active press, and independent-minded judiciary based on English common law, and Parliamentary oversight of the British government. It was infused with progressive values of 19th century British political life including the criteria of public service merit and praiseworthy accomplishments.

These two noble ideals, meritorious as they may be in themselves, could not submerge the cry for human freedom. The British Raj was a despotic state maintained by foreign agents. By the turn of the 20th century both endogamous and exogamous nationalist leaders were steadfastly contesting imperial rule, with the objective of establishing an independent India (Roberts 1967).

History was on their side. Increasingly, 19th century empires proved burdensome to their metropolitan governments. In 1947 the British Labor Government "quit" India (P. Moon 1962), with the split of the once unified Raj into two competing polities—India and Pakistan. Human cost of this hurried act was horrendous. Several million people were displaced; several hundred thousand lives were lost; a rich multi-culture was ruptured. This grievous wound soon spread into countless cancerous sores. Original Pakistan was an impossible juridical entity which consisted of a number of predominantly disparate Muslim communities (*ummah*) ringing the northern tier of British India. Its two provinces, East and West, were separated by over one thousand miles of Indian territory. In 1971, following a bitter civil struggle, the East Province splintered off into the new nation-state of Bangladesh (Sayeed 1980).

Although the rationale for Pakistan's creation was to provide a homeland for subcontinent Muslims, quite a contrary history emerged. Pakistani leaders were

never able to articulate a Zion where the "spiritually pure and clean" could gather together (C.R. Ali 1946:225).² Even a Pakistan that could serve as a depository of the subcontinent Islamic tradition, such as the case of the Republic of China—Taiwan for its Confucian ethics—remains poorly conceived and articulated.

Pakistan's creation surgically severed the soul of the Muslim past. The greatness of the Muslim past was to be found in India and not in Pakistan. Except for provincial Lahore, Pakistan inherited no great monuments to the Mughal or Islamic past. This situation also applied to the intellectual enclaves of pre-partitioned India which were so critical to any society's future. Nor was there any significant migration of these enclaves to Pakistan such as occurred to Taiwan following the 1949 Communist takeover of Mainland China. In this instance, nearly complete universities and research centers reestablished themselves in the new safe-haven of the fortress island.³

In contrast, the masses of Muslim refugees (*muhajirs*) were overwhelmingly poor and socially displaced. Those individual intellectuals who opted for Pakistan were typically engulfed in a sea of confusion—with no ready opportunities to serve effectively in building a new society—although a number of them entered the elite government services. Even today, after four decades, their lives and the lives of their children remain troublesome. Entrenched parochial interests continue to treat them as outsiders, if not pariahs (Ziring 1987:52-80). Since partition did not take the form of revolutionary change, Pakistan increasingly became imprisoned by its constrictive history. It continues not much more than an ideal superimposed over more or less Muslim regions which were political entities in their own right, and with long pasts. Historically, these regions have been volatile, which was evidenced in the location of the British-India military cantonments at Quetta, Peshawar and Lahore. As with the British Raj, Pakistani authorities have been quick to utilize military force to suppress Muslim irredentists — the Afghans and Pathans in the Northwest Frontier Province, the Bengalis in the former East Wing, the Baluchis in Baluchistan tribal area, and the Sindhis in the Sind. Authorities have shown little restraint as well in dealing with sectarian controversies between Sunni and Shiite sects and ethnic disturbances between *muhajirs* and indigenous groups. In political context Pakistan continues as a large remnant of a recent great empire, with its old discordant tendencies. In pejorative terms it has been characterized as a Garrison, Praetorian or Bonapartist state (La Porte, Jr. 1969:842-61; Sayeed 1980:Chapter 3; Richter 1978:406-26; Richter 1986a:113-16 & 136-37; and Gardezi and Rashed 1983). Yet moving beyond authoritarian rule could possibly unleash primordial forces which would be aggravated by conditions of intense poverty and excessive population growth.

Against its turbulent ecology, Pakistan constitutes a political enigma. It is clearly an incomplete state (Badgley 1971:Chapter 3), a sort of imperial anachronism. Nevertheless, Pakistan's economy continues to make steady

progress: agricultural production increased; more basic industries developed; tolerable law and order maintained. Throughout the 1980s and onto the 1990s it managed surprisingly well in coping with more than two million Afghan refugees. Its civil and military organization remained intact, insuring that core government functions were carried out. The development issue, however, remained: Can this momentum, uneven as it may be, continue? In a more important and larger sense: What is Pakistan's future in face of a "New World Order"? To survive, let alone progress, Pakistan must clearly undergo major social change and reform its government operations, to which it is no stranger. Since its beginnings, Pakistan has experienced nearly a continuous dialogue on the need for reordering its being (Gorvine 1965:321-36; Hoque 1970; and Chaudhuri 1965). Great attention has been given to reforming its personnel/civil service function—with experts drawn from home and abroad. Public discussions on personnel reform have been open and intense, with resounding clash of ideas.

Some of these ideas were introduced into practice as reform measures but time shows that they took on little or no systemic worth. Often they were considered out of institutional context, serving as cosmetic plastering on the old established system. Basically, they were "disjointed fixes" which were quickly displaced by forces of dynamic conservatism—return to the old ways. Suggested here is that the unsatisfactory results in personnel change and reform could be traceable to the limited nature of the Pakistani state, with its "fuzzy" ethos. Unlike Indonesia with its *Pancasila* (five pillars of the state), there never emerged in Pakistan an integrative ideal or myth in which its diverse ethnic and social groups could share as a sense of common destiny (Jones 1991b:6-32). As a consequence, divergent parochialism dominates Pakistan's political history and weakening nationalist tendencies. Without a modern army, Pakistan would have long splintered away, much like the recent occurrences in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Pakistan is an extremely contentious society. In political context it can only be ruled, not governed. Its personnel/civil service is contextualized within the reality of political rulership. Authoritarian practice takes precedence over democratic procedure. The exercise of power is institutionalized in the hands of a few individuals who are mainly located in strategic government positions invested with economic resources.

It could be concluded that Pakistan's civil service constitutes an unfortunate legacy of British imperialism which must be eradicated. This is a gross simplification. The civil service, unlike Pakistan itself, has a long and illustrious history. Its basal values are buried deep within individual psyches and infused into organizational culture. Its institutional character is much like a gnarled tree with deep rootings of labyrinthine dimension. It evidences unusual age and survival capabilities. How to accept these basal values and reformulate them into a more responsible and effective personnel system constitutes the challenge of the day. The gnarled tree cannot easily be uprooted, but then it could possibly be reshaped. It should be recognized that there can be no ready "fixes." For

instance, position classification has utility in the United States, but its complete features cannot be transposed to Pakistan.

Civil service systems are unique cultural products, with long and deep memories. In the terms of cultural anthropologists, they are artifacts. This investigation will utilize the same methodological perspective. It will seek to identify basal values of Pakistan's public personnel system and practice in such vernacular notions as "me folks," "us folks," "they folks." How do these inherent relationships influence decisionmaking and levels of productivity?

Out of Pakistan's clashing of personnel ideas there emerged a rich descriptive literature on its civil service. The cultural artifact is well described.⁴ In contrast, understanding of its inherent dynamics, its veritable ecology, remains obscure (Hashmi 1989). Since there is no reason to believe that disruptive tensions of the present system will go away, there remains an urgency that something should be done. However, constructive intervention demands a deeper understanding of the cultural being of the civil service system. This becomes possible only if viable comparisons can be drawn. Here the global scheme developed by P.N. Rastogi and Geertz Hofstede appear especially useful, and they will be utilized (Rastogi 1988; Hofstede 1983:75-89 and 1980).

The remainder of this investigation will comprise four sections. The first discusses the character and behavior of Pakistan's administrative state. The second examines the structure and control mechanisms of the personnel system. The third addresses the infusion of selected systemic inputs. The fourth constitutes a general summary and conclusion.

The Administrative State

With wholesale decolonization following World War II, Western and Asian leaders typically assumed that the state in the European tradition could be transposed to Asian cultures.⁵ Establishment of relatively firm geographic boundaries was deemed critically important. Once this occurred in the form of an official act, either secured by a declaration of a revolutionary body and/or a grant of the imperial power, the remainder of state formation would take on characteristics of a "self-fulfilling prophecy." Newly liberated people driven by newly released public zeal would become engaged in constitution and reconstitution of democratic governance. During this process, they would rediscover and reinvent their own rich institutional heritages and traditions. As free people, they would learn to live as responsible citizens, being active and resolute participants for the good of their own state (Almond and Verba:1989a, 1989b; Eldersveld, Jagannadham and Barnabas 1968).

Founding Intent and Philosophical Divergences

Drawing heavily from British Fabian and American Progressive thought, the new polity conceived by Pakistan's founders was to be an administrative state which would be characterized as encompassing a democratic and humane society based on egalitarian principles and social compassion. This ideal fits within subcontinent Muslim tradition.⁶ The reformed British Raj of now ninety years gave historical credence that the administrative state represented, indeed, a superior form of socio-wisdom (Tinker 1966:23-86; Cohn 1966:87-140; Wodruuff 1954).⁷

Men and women of goodwill and honest intent, a sort of new governing class, could fulfill this ideal through bureaucratic means (Jones 1990:5-31; Braibanti 1962:14-24). In quick time this enabling ideal was transformed into an establishment organization which was characterized by old imperial institutions invested with a new optimism of social progress. Centralized planning with the government heavily involved in allocation of productive resources would be the key to national success.⁸

As current history reveals, superior administration over any extended period of time, say 15 or more years, was difficult to achieve, and especially in limited states such as Pakistan.⁹ Good intentions could readily result in bad outcomes. Good human beings often became corrupt individuals. Building a national state was not an easy matter. Required was extraordinary circumstance which was molded by extraordinary leaders. With the British hurried "Quit India" policy, Pakistan may have been unfairly victimized. It never had sufficient time to get its "political house" in order, especially as to the essence of its being.

Pakistan's two leading founders, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, were not religiously minded. They were secularists within the British constitutional tradition. Their objective was to establish a nation-state for Muslims living on the subcontinent and not an Islamic state for the believers. They understood the contradictions inherent in founding a state based on religion. They believed Pakistan should be a modern state, and not one constrained by strict obedience to scriptural injunctions. Their viewpoint clashed early with that held by Islamic fundamentalists. As the late Maulana Abdul-L-Ala Maududi, founder of the fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islam stated: "An Islamic state is an ideological state. Only those who espouse the ideology can run the state" (Rosenthal 1965:212; Cf. Sayeed 1968 and Syed 1982). This issue remains unresolved. Yet, fortunately for Pakistan, its inherited legal system was not summarily discarded. In times of great disorder, its institutional elements coalesced in arresting abortive activities in the systematic application of the role of law (Braibanti 1963a:360-440; Haider 1967). The late General Zia-ul-Haq may have sought to move "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State..." but he was never able to replace the basic tenets of British constitutionalism and its underlying

common law (Ziring 1984:931-46). Ironically, this legal tempering of political excesses has been most fully manifested in the complex dynamics of Pakistan's establishment organization which has often been assailed but not adequately understood.

Four Substances of the Establishment Organization

In a crude analogy, the ancient notion of the four substances¹⁰ of air, water, fire and earth applies to the basic constituents of the Pakistan establishment organization. These are: (a) the concentration of power and authority in the central government (air), (b) the historic district administration (water), (c) the secretariat system (fire), and (d) the cadre system (earth) (March and Olsen 1984:734-49; Wildavsky 1987:3-21; Smith 1988:89-108). With deep historical dynamics, these four substances have more or less blended together in formulating an ethos as to the grandeur of the state.

Elitism in Pakistan's social life is a strong value, with heavy emphasis on ascriptive rather than prescriptive characteristics. Excessive attention is given to maintaining social structure and pattern which profoundly affects how human beings are perceived and controlled. Over the centuries the individualistic Islam flowing out of the deserts of Arabia was infused by pervasive Hinduism. Pakistan has its social caste system which is complex and variegated. The civil service can be conceived of as a contextualized class/caste system. Hence here may be found its strong disposition for systemic preference given to generalists, cadres, and form — with established pattern an inordinate objective.

In design it is a command system resting on Mughal institutions and British conservative administrative practice. It is characterized by a rather narrow and dismal view of human nature. Basically, people are not trustworthy, following somewhat MacGregor's category of Theory X behavior. Distrust rather than trust is the governing rule in human affairs, with no one ever fully levelling with someone else. Information as power which is purchased and sold is well understood. Dealing with corruption in Pakistan is an extremely difficult matter, since there are so many accepted "levels of truth." Yet paradoxically, embodied in the civil service is a spirit of élan. Gentlemen of good breeding and education can accomplish anything they set out to do — quell vicious mobs, defeat radical dissidents, climb fortress mountains, tame torrential rivers. Good individuals of proper class/caste will prevail. Such belief in individual accomplishment is facilitated by institutional entities which enhance rulership by the "chosen one."

Concentration of Power and Authority. Constitutionally, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has a federal form of government. Such as with the previous constitutions (1956, 1962 and 1973), powers and responsibilities are divided between the federal (central) and provincial governments. Most of the financial

and human resources, however, are under the control of the federal government. Along with other vested powers, Pakistan functions more as a unitary than a federal government (Feldman 1956; Chaudhury 1955:10-20; Wheeler 1970; Zafar 1974; Haider 1987:1-44; Azfar 1991:49-86). Regardless of designation, power and authority are heavily concentrated in the federal government, with the provinces functioning mainly as subnational entities (Khan 1987:808-10).

District Administration. The district continues as the fundamental unit of administration in Pakistan. As with the British Raj, Pakistan has not been successful in developing viable local and urban governments.¹¹ The Deputy Commissioner (DC) who is usually a member of an elite cadre (formerly the Civil Service of Pakistan [CSP]) remains the symbol of the Government's authority and power (Gable 1964:1-19; Islam 1989:280; Mahmud 1987:201-52). Nation-building and functional agencies are often dependent on the goodwill and protection of the DC (Qayyum 1962:128-41; Hashmi 1987c:80-92). It is here where so much corruption occurs in Pakistan, with the large landlords, powerful industrialists and unscrupulous commercial agents securing favorable advantages through bribery and pay-offs.¹²

Secretariat System. Every major reform commission/committee addressed complexities and inadequacies of the secretariat system. Nevertheless, it remains intact. The Secretariat is based on the notion of a separation between policy and administration, staff and line. Policymaking is considered a generalist function. Consequently, the opportunities for technical personnel, say a civil engineer, to be placed in major policymaking positions remain limited. The secretariats are powerful institutions. The secretaries, as Nasir Islam (1989:279) notes, "Enjoy powers akin to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in a corporate organization" (Cf. Hashmi 1987b:xiii-xvii).¹³ While under the Rules of Business, they are technically advisors to ministers, in reality they are often the more powerful figures in the decisionmaking process. As Shafik H. Hashmi (1987c:78; Islam 1989:279) observes: "(I)n Pakistan there has been a government of Secretaries most of the time."

Instrumentation of this outcome is to be found in the structure of the secretariat organization and the hierarchy of bureaucratic positions.¹⁴ Under the 1973 Constitution, Pakistan has a ministerial form of government (Imtiaz 1987:45-124). Ministries usually number around twenty-five, consisting of one or more divisions. A division is a self-contained administrative unit such as cabinet, health or railways. In 1983 there were 41 divisions and 6 division-like secretariats (President, Senate, Election, Ombudsman, Prime Minister, and National Assembly).

Each division is composed of a central secretariat, attached departments and subordinate offices of the division, and autonomous and/or semi-autonomous organizations.

Position in rank, which is based on cadre and seniority, is used to hold the entire structure together—secretary, additional secretary, joint secretary, deputy secretary, and section officer (chief clerical person). In practice those holding positions in the secretariat usually enjoy higher rank than those in technical/line operations (Kennedy 1987:6-8; Sayeed 1966).

Cadre Structure. Sometimes termed service, the complex structure serves as the principal binding attraction that holds the entire administrative organization or civil bureaucracy together. In broad terms, the civil bureaucracy breaks down into two supra-ordinate cadres or services, a centrally recruited service and a provincially recruited service (Hussain 1987:125-200).

Following the practice of the British Raj, the structure is based on rank classification. Before the 1970s reforms, the cadre structure comprised four horizontal categories (Classes I to IV) based on the degree of importance and responsibilities of the work performed (Goodnow 1964; Chaudhuri 1963; Ahmed 1968).

Members of Class I and most of Class II were gazetted officers. Their postings and transfers were published in the government gazette. Class I and II officers constituted only one and two percent respectively of the central and provincial government employees. Class III employees, comprising approximately 60 percent of the government work force, were mainly clerks who carried out routine activities under the supervision of Class I and II officers. Class IV employees served in custodial-type jobs such as messenger, peon, driver and laborer.

Class I officers received their appointment from the Central Government's Establishment Division, under the signature of the President and members of Provincial Class I officers, under the secretary of their department or by some other higher authority. Class II officers were appointed by the secretary of a department or some other equivalent authority. Class III employees were appointed by a deputy secretary or equivalent officer and Class IV employees by even lower rank authority. No civil servant could be dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Conditions and benefits for each service category were substantially different including pay structure, leave, pension and medical benefits. For example the pay compensation between top ranking Class I and lower Class IV employees was between 30 to 40 times. In contrast, in the United States (1970) it was about ten times.

Class I officers were vertically structured into twelve categories, designated the Central Superior Services. Two of these services, Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), were designated as the All Pakistan Service (APS). Members of these two services could be posted by the central

government to senior positions in either the central or provincial governments. Other services were functionally designated such as the Foreign Service, Pakistan Audit and Account Service, Taxation Service, and Information Service.

Civil Service of Pakistan, Police Service and Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service were extremely important in the exercise of bureaucratic power. The generalist Provincial Service (PS) was next in importance.

The administrative structure was organized around the CSP as the pivotal service, with over 700 strategic positions set aside for its postings in both the central and provincial governments. The cadre strength was set at approximately 530 but it was never fully filled. Throughout its existence the CSP was fewer than 400 officers.

According to the Composition of Cadre Rules (1960s), two-thirds of the key secretariat positions of secretary, joint secretary and deputy secretary were to be filled by CSP officers. This included the Cabinet Secretary and the Permanent Secretary, both of whom were key presidential aides.

The CSP Cadre also maintained strategic control in the judiciary, with ten percent of the posts reserved to the service. A significant number of CSP officers were assigned as well to public corporations and semi-autonomous bodies. In the late 1960s, of the 36 chairmen of public corporations, 17 were CSP officers. The Economic Pool was established in 1960 with a strength of 125 officers who served in the central ministries of Finance, Commerce and Industries. Sixty percent of the positions were allocated to the CSP and 40 percent to other central superior services.

When posted in the provinces, CSP officers came under the operational control of the Provincial Governors, who were appointed by the President. Immediate supervision of these CSP officers was delegated to the Chief Secretary, who was always a CSP officer. For a CSP officer to advance in his career, it was essential that he serve as District Commissioner (DC) early, which was typically from nine to eighteen months. This time period became normal throughout his career—moving from one posting to another. The more technically and professionally trained civil servants regarded CSPs as “birds of passage.”

Recruitment to each of the superior services was by means of competitive examinations administered by the Central Public Service Commission. The same process was utilized by the Provincial Public Service Commission. With the high prestige of government employment, sizeable numbers of college graduates applied to take these examinations.

Each cadre, whether central or provincial, was separately administered, with specific posts reserved for its members. There was virtually no interchange of

personnel between the cadres, although the rules for each service provided for a small number of deputation to compatible posts.

In sum, the entire bureaucracy was dominated by a small elite of central superior officers numbering no more than 2000, of which approximately 400 were CSPs (Ziring 1971:Chapter 6; Sayeed 1958:131-46; Burki 1969:239-54; Braibanti 1966b:209-354). It functioned as a large authoritarian family (*ma papism* or mother-father protector).

Administrative Behavior

Cynicism runs deep in Pakistan, with the civil services the object of persistent and sarcastic criticism (La Porte 1982:127 ff.; Habib 1973). The bureaucracy is sick, inflicted with the pathologies of "clientelism, incrementalism, arbitrariness, imperialism and parochialism" (Khan 1991:59-73). The poor and disadvantaged have virtually no voice in political affairs. Sensitive, courteous and satisfying public service is rare. There is a wide gap between treatment of the rank and file employees in contrast with higher ranked officers. Lower employees typically are undernourished, shabbily dressed men who are jammed together in dingy rooms filled with large almirahs, piles of dusty files, and dilapidated furniture. Often there are inadequate sanitary facilities. Such dismal working conditions contrast sharply with those of upper civil servants, reflecting a difference in administrative status and culture (Masih-uz-Zaman. 1969:63-68; 1963:285-98).

The upper administrators are excessively dependent on notations entered in files by junior clerks. It takes an infinite amount of time to make even a simple decision. Performance occurs at the common denominator. Cooperation both vertically and horizontally is difficult to achieve, with a lot of suspicion and distrust evidenced in personal relations.

Pakistani culture places a high value on loyalty and obligation to family, kin and other reference groups. *Safarish* is a common practice, i.e., those in influential positions strive to secure appointments of friends and kin to positions in the civil service, as well as using their government position to secure special privilege.¹⁵

Segmented Society and Narcissus Distortions. Pakistanis have a "knack" for becoming entrapped in their own creations, being in effect their own worst enemies. They never seem able to escape from "Plato's Cave," living within a psychic prison (Morgan 1986:Chapter 7). A great deal of this behavior may be explained within the terms of Pakistan's social segmentation infused with pervasive narcissism (Lasch 1979; Harmon 1989:283-312; Jackall 1983:118-30; Diamond 1984:195-214, 1988:166-90; Diamond and Allcorn 1986:709-31).

Pakistan's diverse social entities are not far removed from being "states within a state," as characterized by "warlordism" (Inayatullah 1976:102-20; Kochanek 1983:Chapter 2; Cf. Kanter 1983:28-36; Jones 1991a:197-235). They are self-serving—compartmentalizing events, problems and actions within their own systems and isolating themselves from others. Cooperation and coordination between social entities is difficult to achieve, and usually only in times of crisis.

The British Raj functioned well within this sort of discordant society since its historic being was once tightly segmented into classes, in-group loyalties, and local orientations. It built organizations around this social reality that worked. An example is the British-Indian Army which merged class and caste into segmented structures. This army became one of the world's finest military organizations (Cohen 1984),¹⁶ with its character subsequently incorporated into Pakistan's independent military. In power relationships, the British officials were masters in playing-off one faction against another — even resorting to bribes and payoffs, awarding special privilege to influentials, resocializing dissidents, and employing selective coercion. Ruling an empire was a stressful game that required a social elite willing to play with its high risks the rulership game. For well over a century the British had an abundance of such players who were joined as well by remarkable Indians (Asaf Hussain 1979; Quddus 1982; Cf. LaPorte 1975; Hashmi 1987a:10-21).

In his study of Asian politics and power, Professor Lucian W. Pye (1985:Chapter 5) identifies narcissism as a pervasive cultural factor in the exercise of authority on the South Asian subcontinent (Cf. Dwivedi 1989:245-52; Dwivedi and Jain 1988:205-14). As he writes:

... leaders see themselves as peculiarly virtuous and are distrustful of others because they suspect that those others do not appreciate their superior worth. Leaders, in short, need the reassurance of admiring followers. The followers are in their way equally dependent as they seek the security of either an understanding guru or an idealized brotherhood (Pye 1985:157, 311-19).

The widespread belief in the grandeur of the state with a strong sovereign provides a comfortable context in the "rewards of narcissism."

Pakistani leaders can speak from the basis of religious truth since Islam has well-defined characteristics: a creed, a book, and a brotherhood. "There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his Prophet." The book is the Koran with its precise rules governing all aspects of life. The brotherhood is the concept that all people have their essence in Allah. Hence all those who believe in the faith stand equal before Allah.

The Islamic concept of *din*, or religion as a whole way of life, provides a respect for authority along with each individual's place in society. As an absolute set of rules, it applies to all people. For Muslims total conformity is expected, and deviants are seen as an abomination to nature and Allah. From this belief is found the Muslim sense of unity in the universe.

In Islam there can be no clear separation between sacred and secular authority. Everything is governed by an all-pervasive religion. The ideal of the Islamic state is that every act government-carries out will implement the words of the Prophet as recorded in the Koran. Leaders glorify government causing them to act in the authority of Allah. The Caliph or sovereign becomes the representative of Allah, to whom alone belongs all the power and authority. Laws of the state are expected to be manifestations of "higher religious laws."

Found in Islam is a contradiction between authoritarian rule in the *khilafah* and popular democracy in the form of a common brotherhood (*ummah*). Decisionmaking should reflect the well-being of the ummah carried out through a full measure of consultation (*shura*). The Islamic state should be a populist society, a "perfect democracy."

The socialization process of Pakistani Muslims reinforces the Islamic views of authority and power. Characteristically, there arise conflicting sentiments between a demanding ummah and an absent father. Briefly stated, Muslim socialization begins in an environment dominated by the mother in which there is little or no contact with the father (Spear 1967:51-54). At the age of five or so, the male child is taken away from his mother to spend the entire day in some rigid school. He must make his own way that mixes stern discipline, protestations of friendship, and the intimidation of older children. If the child is a son of an elite family, he will be sent to Atchison College in Lahore (sometimes called Chiefs College) which was founded upon the tradition of the English public school. Often he will be waited upon by two or more family servants.

Found in this socialization process are a number of pathological problems, which are traceable to the ambivalence in the exercise of authority. In this regard, Ijaz Hussain Batalvi, advocate Supreme Court and West High Court in Lahore, makes an insightful observation:

... in our families, there is no democracy... from the very beginning (children) start hating authority. ... Speaking in psychological terms, our relationship with the administrator is the relationship of a child who hates the authority of his father because it is always misused without understanding the child's reactions (Batalvi 1965:31).¹⁷

Pakistan has paid a painful price for its exaggerated narcissistic behavior, too often falling into traps of costly delusion. The biggest was the 1971 Bengali debacle, with the eventual breakup of the two wings. Mesmerized by a glorified past of Mughal greatness and power, the then West Pakistanis boldly attempted in the latter part of 1970 to put down Bengali irredentism. The Bengalis, who did not fall into the so-called category of martial races, were not expected to fight. But they did fight, and nearly 100,000 West Pakistani soldiers capitulated (Klass 1972:23-27; Sesson and Rose 1989).

A Performance Assessment

After more than four decades of existence, the nation continues entrapped in a struggle for survival, with primordial factions and groups pathologically sapping its national resolve.¹⁸ It is a troubled nation-state, faced with enormous difficulties in resolving its domestic issues and forging bonds of national unity.¹⁹ There has never evolved a pervasive consensus about its philosophical premise that in turn could provide underpinnings for the nation's fundamental law, structure, processes, policies and programs. Even under the regime of the late President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, with its strong emphasis on Islamization (*Nizam-i-Islam*), philosophical and emotional bondings for national unity remained a political challenge. Although strongly contested, the inherited imperial tradition within the context of secularized Islam has not been discarded (Feldman 1956; Haider 1987:1-44; Azfar 1991:49-86). As a unifying force, secularized Islam never effectively bridged parochial and provincial differences, reduced tribal and ethnic discords, resolved sectarian antagonisms, or provided entrance of the *muhajirs* into established local societies. It could not neutralize the old and durable authoritarian systems found mainly in the power structures of the large landowners (Ziring 1987:52-80). It did, however, provide grounds for Pakistan's uneven financial and industrial development (Richter 1986b:207-18; Burki and La Porte 1984; Papanek 1968), keep alive the ideal of representative government and democratic governance, and preserve the notions of judicial fairness and distributive justice (Ahmad 1978; Taylor 1983:182-84). Within this context, the administrative state maintained core governmental functions—enforcement of law and order, collection of revenue, administration of justice, and maintenance of basic communication infrastructures such as roads, postal services, and canals. Economic progress has steadily occurred, with enhanced agricultural production and development of new industry.

Current history reveals that administrative states have inherent organizational limitations. To govern the administrative state requires concentrated/undifferentiated power of a manipulative (coercive) nature. To achieve constructive socioeconomic progress requires diffused/differentiated power of a market (competitive) nature. Built into the society must be a high capacity of self-learning to carry out meaningful social change and transformation (Plattner and Diamond 1992). Here lies Pakistan's dilemma. Its small elite understands well the subcontinent's fissiparous tendencies.

The Establishmentarian Personnel System

Pakistan's administrative state may be conceived as an elongated grandfather's clock. Its energy is derived from two parallel but imbalanced weights, causing the long pendulum to swing back and forth. Although crude in design, the clock is functional, providing an adequate measurement of time for the conduct of most human activities.

The operating core of this clock-like device is a compact personnel system which takes on an establishmentarian character. Through the regulating means of the Establishment Division, the personnel system exercises inordinate formal authority throughout the entire organizational apparatus. The Establishment Division basically controls the strategic apex of the administrative state and profoundly influences performance of the technical cores of functional agencies.

Pakistan's administrative state incorporates a command structure within the terms of a military organization. In daily affairs the Establishment Division is the primary voice of command. In conduct it behaves more as a line than a staff agency.

The personnel system is a product of a long but disjointed history. It is conservative in design and practice, with maintaining institutional tradition taking precedence over fostering change and development. Productivity is not a major consideration in the conduct of public affairs, although lip-service is paid to the notions of economy and efficiency. Patterned behavior in an institutional context is valued and stressed.

Although challenged during the last two decades, the upper civil service continues as the paramount institution in national life. Of all the states with a British imperial tradition, Pakistan has the most powerful bureaucracy and, by contrast, the weakest legislative and political institutions. At times its judiciary has risen to curtail bureaucratic excesses (Braibanti 1966a:274-99). Although the military has shown no hesitation in intervening in the civil government except for the position of chief executive, its officer corps has not been significantly incorporated in wholesale numbers into the civil bureaucracy. Unlike Indonesia, as an example, the British tradition of the military confined to the barracks remained in place.

Foreign Intrusion and a Contrast

The notion of public personnel administration was essentially a foreign intrusion from the 1960s U.S. technical assistance effort in public administration,²⁰ and somewhat rejected by Pakistanis in both theory and practice (Braibanti 1976:65-76).²¹ The principal reason is to be found in two contrary concepts of the public service—the American egalitarian orientation and the Pakistani elite orientation.

As a nation born out of a successful republican revolution, Americans dismissed the concept of the state resting on an ascriptive class early. Its public service would be egalitarian in character, drawn from the people. It would be practical in orientation, being structured around work to be performed. Systemic preference would be given to organizational structure based on the abstraction of

position rather than that of rank. Americans held reservations about classical theory that the state as an employer, and the civil servants as employee, were both *sui generis*. Americans were citizens and not subjects. Their notion of popular sovereignty held the state to be subordinate to the people.

In contrast, Pakistan achieved its independence through political default. By continuing the imperial tradition, Pakistan accepted the classical theory of the state with its supposition of the civil service; and that codes including constitutional provisions were necessary to protect the bureaucracy. Involved in this political thought were notions of master and slave, monarch and subject (Public Administration Division, U.N. 1966; Chaudhuri 1960:279-92). The most singular difference between American and Pakistani personnel practices may be found in the nature of administrative politics. The Establishment Division functions true to its title. It maintains the establishmentarian character of its administrative state by a skillful play of "brokerage" politics—the determination as to who gets the best and worst of jobs along with other benefits.

In contrast, no central personnel agency in the United States has ever been vested with equivalent authority. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management, successor to the U.S. Civil Service Commission, can only foster good personnel practices. The brokerage activity rests either in the political arena of the Office of the President or of the Secretaries of Departments. While the brokerage of upper positions in the United States is diffused, in Pakistan it is concentrated. To a lesser extent this applies as well to the general conduct of personnel matters.

Permanent Structural Components

With each major effort to reform the civil service, ironically the establishmentarian personnel system emerged not only intact but fundamentally stronger. In a full sense this includes the Establishment Divisions in the federal and provincial governments along with the secretariat organization and cadre structure. The once semi-autonomous Public Service Commissions which in the 1960s offered some possibility for personnel innovation have been reorganized as attached agencies to their respective Establishment Divisions (La Porte 1991:115-37; Baxter 1991:27-48; Burki 1991:155-182; Cf. Abbas 1968:219-224).²²

Establishment Divisions. Essentially the personnel activities assigned to both the federal and provincial establishment divisions include the regulation of recruitment, discipline, terms and conditions of work service for each of the occupational groups except those administered by the Finance Division, the overview of training institutions in public administration such as the Administrative Staff College at Lahore, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development at Peshawar, and National Institutes of Administration (one in each province along with one at Karachi), and general career planning.

Public Service Commissions. Under Constitutional provisions, Public Service Commissions were established in both the federal and the provincial governments. Currently, these constitutional agencies are attached to the Establishment Division. They are vested with the heavy responsibility to insure impartiality, fairness, objectivity, and justice in carrying out the personnel function. Included are the personnel activities of examination, recruitment, placement and discipline.

As an integral aspect of Ayub Khan's reform efforts in the early 1960s, the public service commissions were conceived as instrumental means by which to infuse and insure "propriety" in the civil service. In the words of Ghulam Nabi M. Memon:

The maintenance of an able, talented Civil Service... honest and efficient..., by both the Government and the public ... the public service is a tortoise which carries the elephant upon which the Government rests (*The Pakistan Times*, 15 January 1968, p.6 and 16 January 1968, p. 6).²³

The intent of some leading students and practitioners in Pakistan was to model the public service commissions after the U.S. Civil Service Commission. As constitutional entities, they would become the strategic means by which to eliminate patronage in the civil services as well as introduce progressive personnel measures, particularly as to "merit" (Quraishi 1963:15-20, 1966:162-66; M.N. Khan 1965:23-34). While the intent of the public service commissions remains, their strategic position in the government has been reduced. They are now attached agencies to their respective Establishment Divisions. Their activities have become narrowly defined, which is mainly advisory in content.

Unmet Issue of Personnel Reform

Students of development administration in the 1960s discerned that the most difficult sort of change and reform related to the structure of the civil service. Pakistan has proven to be no exception. Its principal decisionmakers function in a personnel system contextualized into a conservative society where authoritarian power in the form of *ma-papism* resides in a small elite; but this authoritarian family has not been a happy one.

Over the last three decades the public personnel system experienced several implusive upheavals. In the late 1960s American and European educated younger officers often chafed under archaic personnel practices. They believed it was time to think in terms of a more egalitarian bureaucracy, based upon true merit and sound human resource development.²⁴ The status and rank prescribed in the bureaucratic class structure (I, II, III and IV) were openly criticized. The Financial Services, particularly the Audit and Accounts, openly confronted the CSP for coveted and powerful posts such as the finance secretary and finance member of public corporations (Jones 1968:225-41, 1969:1-38). Other services

followed suit. In East Pakistan, groups of Class III and IV employees used the *Gharao* technique by surrounding and holding high officials in their offices until their demands for better wages and benefits were met. This was a desperate measure by desperate people. In time this effort took on the characteristics of class warfare. (M.A. Ali 1970:4-5).

The Establishment Division sensed that change was necessary. In late 1969 it began to take constructive measures to become a central personnel agency (La Porte 1991:115-37; Baxter 1991:27-48; Burki 1991:155-182; Cf. Abbas 1968:219-224). In the meantime, Pakistan's political situation continued to deteriorate. On 20 December 1971, Pakistan's second military government handed power over to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) (Burki 1980).

A cardinal feature of Bhutto's 67-month regime was administrative reform, which essentially centered on revamping the upper civil services. On 20 August 1973, he gave specific details as to reforms in the administrative system. These included:

- (1) abolition of service cadres, and their functional replacement by "occupational groups";
- (2) establishment of a Unified National Pay Scale replacing the numerous pay scales extant at the time of the reform;
- (3) discontinuance of the long-standing practice of reservation of certain posts in the central secretariat for members of the elite cadres;
- (4) establishment of a program of joint pre-service training; and
- (5) establishment of provisions for the induction of lateral recruits, i.e., individuals without cadre affiliation, to posts within the central secretariat. Provision for vertical movement between cadres was also introduced (Kennedy 1982:42-56).

With this announcement it appeared that much of the old elitist system would be swept away, with progressive measures of personnel management introduced. A major objective was opening up the staffing of strategic positions.²⁵ On functional guidelines, the central public services were classified into seventeen occupational groups. The posts reserved for the CSP Cadre (generalist/policy/administration) were placed into three different occupational groups. The field administrator posts were classified into a new District Management Group (DMG). The policy positions in the Central Secretariat were placed into the new Secretariat Group. A new Tribal Areas Group (TAG) was established to administer federally controlled tribal territories, mainly those located near the Afghanistan border. The three financial accounts services were placed into one

Accounts Group. A new pay scale was developed, the Unified Pay Scale of 23 grades.

The civil service became more egalitarian in character. The prestige of technical/professional occupations was enhanced. Nevertheless, some Pakistani students of government believe that the reforms were too limited (Islam 1989; Kennedy 1987). The old CSP cadre in its new category of DMG appears to have re-emerged as a major force in the bureaucracy. In spite of the years of criticism, these individuals have proven management skills gained from careful selection, systematic rotation, and specific institutional training of both pre- and post-entry character (Burki 1988:1082-1100). Sadly, it appears that the once high prestige and caliber of the civil service diminished, with the best and the brightest now seeking employment in business and/or the professions (Kennedy 1985:25-42). The unmet issue of the establishmentarian character of the personnel system remained unsatisfactorily addressed.

Dynamic Conservatism in Personnel Policy and Practice

Pakistan may be a tremulous society but this characteristic may not be read as a transforming society. Quite to the contrary, massive and intense poverty, have fostered implosive surges, some of severe intensity, but innate feelings of the populace is a desire for stability—a tendency to strive to remain the same. Change has been resisted in the form of dynamic conservatism where traditional forces quickly come forth to counteract those at work for a new state of affairs (Schon 1971:Chapter 2).²⁶

Because of its hydraulic nature, paramount consideration must be given to system maintenance and stability. Pakistan is an ecologically vulnerable society since it is faced with massive salinity and waterlogging problems, for which there are no immediate solutions (Jones *et al.* 1984; Jones 1987a:1-44). Its future calls for major social sacrifice but there is little for which Pakistan can sacrifice. In the short run Pakistani leaders can do little to control and manage the ecology of their state. Its population growth will be high; its borders will be insecure; its diverse ethnic, religious, communal and regional difference will continue; its traditional social and economic interests will remain entrenched. Reform is necessary, but there is little indication that this can be accomplished through any inherent socio-learning process. Strategic intervention of the government to accomplish change is necessary. But how to employ political authority in an "unreforming" society constitutes a horrendous problem.

In historical practice, Pakistan opted for a strategy of gradualism rather than radical transformation. Grand visionaries have experienced great difficulties. Pakistanis are practical people, accepting life in pragmatic ways. Pakistan's central planning has been very much non-doctrinaire in character, granted with a

bias for large capital investments in public enterprise. Even this bias now appears to be changing, with its recent initiatives in privatization and liberalization of the marketplace.

Within the practice of gradualism, changes in the public personnel system were introduced. Some of these introductions resulted from internal political demands and others as external forms of innovation. Fundamentally they were expediciencies to deal with "moment of time" issues. This process was within the tradition of the British Raj's "muddling through." If something works, keep it—even though not understanding why. In both thought and deed, it made good sense to be conservative rather than radical. In this context, Bhutto's program of radical reform constituted a sociopolitical aberration.

Radical Reform

The socioeconomic upheavals of 1969 which led to Ayub Khan's downfall (Burki 1972:201-12) paved the way for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's 1970 election victory. On 20 December 1971, the military turned the country's administration over to Bhutto, as chairman of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) (Burki 1980:Chapter 1). His success at the polls came largely from a constituency which desired transformation of the country's social, economic and political institutions. With the ascent of the Left in the PPP, Bhutto's reform took on a radical character such as the nationalization of all basic industries and financial institutions. The notion of Islamic socialism was employed to infuse legitimacy into the reform efforts.

From his experience in government, Bhutto realized that the current administrative structure would not serve his socioeconomic and political designs. He distrusted the bureaucracy, especially the CSP cadre. One of his first initiatives was to remove from the civil service a number of senior CSP officers who were prominent in the former Ayub Khan government. To consolidate his power in the office of Prime Minister, Bhutto believed it was necessary to impose a legal provision which restricted the upper civil services in making independent decisions as well as holding civil servants answerable to the executive head of the government, i.e., the prime minister and his ministers. The 1973 Constitution eliminated significant constitutional protections covering civil servants. Both the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 continued the provisions of the British Raj organic act that gave recourse to the courts when their rights were violated. For example, a civil servant could only be removed from the service before the age of retirement (usually 55 years) if the hiring authority could successfully charge that the person under scrutiny had not fulfilled the terms of his employment—a difficult legal matter to prove.

When Bhutto came to power the civil service comprised about one million persons. The cadre strength of the CSP was some 320 officers. Of the 300 senior

positions in the government (permanent secretaries in central and provincial governments, chief secretaries of the provinces, heads of public corporations, commissioners of divisions and deputy commissioners of districts) 225 were held by the CSP cadre (Burki 1980:99). They also held positions in the High Court. Perplexingly, the CSP purposefully restricted its yearly intake of probationers, but at the same time the cadre strove to increase its number of reserved postings, including those top positions in the growing public enterprise sector.

In the mid-1960s a few CSP officers could foresee their cadre's potential vulnerability. They sought to increase its numerical strength by introducing specializations within the context of the U.S. military rank and occupational specialties. They were too late, and did too little. The CSP did represent Pakistan's best body of generalist managers, but they were few in number. The cadre had only a few persons with technical backgrounds.²⁷

Prime Minister Bhutto, in an address to the nation on 20 August 1973, announced his reforms of the administrative system. He had previously stated: "(In) a democratic state where government is popularly elected, with its main aim the improvement of the condition of the common man, the question of exploitation by the state does not arise" (Gustafson 1973:256).

In his August address, Bhutto criticized a vital aspect of the bureaucracy's lore—

It is often averred that the bureaucratic apparatus is a neutral instrument which can be bent to any kind of policy. But this neutrality is mythical. The bureaucracy itself is a powerful vested interest, concerned more with its own good than with the good of the public (Gustafson 1973:256).

He went on to note that:

No institution in the country has so lowered the quality of our national life as what is called *Naukarshahi*. It has done so by imposing a caste system on our society. It has created a class of Brahmins or mandarins, unrivalled in its snobbery and arrogance, insulated from life of the people and incapable of identifying itself with them (Gustafson 1973:256).

Bhutto stressed the need of incorporating specialists into principal decisionmaking positions — "scientists, engineers, doctors, economists, statisticians." A "people's government cannot condone a system which elevates the generalist above the scientist, the technician, the professional expert, the artist or the teacher."

Lateral entry into government service would be allowed for talented individuals drawn from banking, insurance, industry and commerce. With these reforms the civil service would be infused with "new blood" and a "new spirit," finding new ways in working for the good of the people.

Bhutto relentlessly pursued his bureaucratic reform. He abolished the cadre associations which provided for influential networkings. By the end of 1972, a total of 1303 civil service officers were purged out of the government (Kennedy 1982:49-51). His control over the Establishment Division was enhanced, while the protective powers of the semi-independent Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions were diminished. A new system of lateral entry was instituted where entrants were not required to satisfy rigorous admission standards such as one administered by the Public Service Commissions. Between 1973-77, 1374 new officers were admitted into the upper government service, a number three times as large as would have resulted under the previous practice (Burki 1980:102). Over 100 were close relatives or associates of ministers in the central cabinet (Burki 1980:102). Under these reform initiatives, the integrity and impartiality of the civil service were jeopardized since civil servants were no longer afforded due protection of constitutional law against political coercion and arbitrariness. In time Bhutto would be haunted by these radical measures. On 5 July 1977, he was forced out of power. Again the military assumed power, with General Zia ul-Haq in control. On 19 March 1978, the Lahore High Court found Bhutto guilty of high crime in attempting to murder Ahmad Raza Kasuri, once a political protege, now turned opponent. The High Court ordered his execution. Final judicial review was concluded on 31 March 1979. The Supreme Court refused to review the lower court verdicts. On 4 April 1979, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged at the Rawalpindi prison.²⁸

In 1978 a high level Civil Services Commission was established to investigate the state of affairs of the nation's public personnel system. As with several of the past commissions, the Government turned to the judiciary for impartial investigation. The chair was the Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq. The Commission found low morale in the civil service. It was critical of the 1973 administrative reforms, stating that many of them were not adequately conceived and carried out. Position classification, position description, performance evaluation, training, and recruitment were areas that had not improved. Equal promotion opportunities for government employees had not been adequately initiated. The Commission criticized the elimination of the former constitutional guarantees which protected the civil service's integrity and security. It recommended the reinstatement of the constitutional safeguards as found in Articles 181 and 182 of the 1956 Constitution.

The unified service structure also came under criticism. The Commission recommended the establishment of a "Pakistan public service" which would include all posts in the federal government. While not returning fully to the pre-Bhutto days, the Commission endorsed, in effect, a continuation of the traditional practice of elitism. The issue of corruption was addressed, with the observation that it was widespread.

With all of the turmoil generated about the civil service over the last three decades (1961-91)—what of reform? It will take more history to be able to make sense out of the Bhutto experience. Possibly the reform effort was out of historical context. The reform certainly ran counter to Pakistan's historic practice of gradualism. The focus of dynamic conservatism "carried the day," even to the end of regicide. Human costs were high. The civil service suffered in profound ways, with its capacity to perform greatly constrained (Kennedy 1987:Chapter 9); yet it must be understood that out of this history systemic measures for change were introduced and/or reinforced.

Systemic Measures for Change

More within Pakistan's practice of gradualism than anything else, five systemic measures may be identified which in abstruse ways are now shaping the civil service's being. These are: (a) maintenance of institutions for public service training, (b) employment of quotas and ethnic preferences, (c) rationalization between technocrats and generalists in staffing key positions, (d) provision for lateral appointment and movement of personnel, and (e) establishment of the Unified National Pay Scale. Also at play was the fostering of Islamization. As Professor Nasir Islam (1990b:97) observed: "(T)he symbolism, appearance, tone, and tenor of Pakistan's public bureaucracy has assumed an Islamic orientation."

Institutions for Public Service Training. Since its earliest days, Pakistan was faced with an acute shortage of professionally and technically educated and trained personnel. For the civil service, this was particularly a serious matter where after independence former British ICS officers were retained in strategic positions, including the Secretary of the Establishment Division.

Unlike the Hindus, the Muslims were reluctant to accept Western education. East Pakistan was almost devoid of any higher education. West Pakistan was better off, with its complex Christian missionary institutions, government colleges, and the University of the Punjab.

Within its tradition of liberal education, the educational policy of the British was oriented toward producing an elitist class (S. Ali 1988:14-16). Consequently, competitive examination for recruitment to the superior services reflected this educational bias which included general science, mathematics, European literature, and modern and classical languages. Sanskrit and Arabic were two non-European subjects. The examinations were taken in the English language. The content and the process of the recruitment examination have never been seriously challenged, although in the public arena it has sometimes been criticized.

In the early 1850s, as articulated by Thomas Babington Macaulay, the rationale for liberal education remains valid today. Young men experiencing

rigorous education in the classroom along with sports will surely distinguish themselves later in public life.

Some students of political development assert that this form of education and socialization resulted in estrangement between elites and masses which possibly was a simplistic observation. While the British educational experience fostered a sentiment of superiority, at the same time it provided for a cosmopolitan outlook, with heavy credence given to intellectual thought. For illustration, a common strand in both British and Indian Muslim social life was an appreciation of poetry, which at times bonded together two otherwise hostile "peoples." The last Governor of the British Raj Northwest Province, Sir Olaf Caroe (1946-47), could recite in the Pashtu language the immortal poems of Khushhal Khan Khatak (1965) with the best of the Pathans. British traditional higher education had its strengths in building character and confidence and competency.

Pakistan inherited as well the imperial practice dating back to the early 1800s in providing preservice training in select institutions for young probationers (Kennedy 1987:Chapter 5). Prior to the administrative reforms of 1973, the probationers were separately trained under programs carried out by their assigned services. The length and content of training each service varied, but the rationale of education and socialization was basic in all of the programs. Presently, all probationers in the superior services are trained at one integrated institution.

However, the legacy of the past was not swept away. The Civil Service Academy (CSA) followed closely the tradition of the British Raj's Haileybury College: the main purpose was to socialize the probationers into the "grand tradition" of the bureaucracy rather than impart technical knowledge and skills. In its "glory years" the CSA spawned a lot of arrogance. CSP probationers were required to be proficient in horseback riding, were given membership in the exclusive Lahore Gymkhana Club, and attended mess nights where formal attire was required and often important officials and foreign guests were invited. The ethos was one of training for rulership in the imperial tradition.

In descending order were found also the Finance Services Academy and the Police Training Institute. These two institutions tended to replicate the CSA. Probationers to the lesser prestigious services received diluted or no preservice training.

Arranged marriage is commonplace in Pakistan society, with those young superior service probationers considered to be "prized" catches. Undergoing probationary training was personally an expensive proposition which was beyond the financial resources of many middle class families. Hence early in their careers many young probationers became victims of opportunistic landlords and industrialists who obligingly provided sums of money to purchase formal attire

and cover other expenses. To live as a gentleman in the British Raj tradition takes independent financial means. Early in the careers of those "bought" probationers, they were required to make "paybacks."

Rigid boundaries within and without each service cadre were maintained. Seniority, a matter of great importance in a person's career, was established as to where one placed in his batch of peers. Subsequently, superior or inferior performance could not significantly modify this once won relationship. The service associations were typically well organized and took active roles in preserving the service tradition. The only social organization which clearly cut across them was the Old Boys Clubs of British universities, mainly those of Oxford and Cambridge. A master's degree from a British institution in itself conveyed status and prestige, and often this fact appeared on business cards along with designation of the service (CSP) (Jones 1987c:302-03; Braibanti 1966:250-51).

Under the Bhutto reforms an integrated preservice training program was instituted. Greater attention was given to training in specific skills and knowledge. Carefully fostered elites continued but in a more egalitarian form. The British dinner jacket for mess nights was replaced by traditional attire. The ethos of rulership was more tightly contextualized within traditional Islamic norms of the subcontinent. Nevertheless the bureaucratic value of guardianship and distrust of "people" politics continued.

Under Bhutto's reform measures, integrated training was not adopted for advanced in-service training. Largely as a consequence of 1950 and early 1960 foreign technical assistance, mainly from the United States, Pakistan established a complex of in-service training institutions.²⁹ The principal ones were the National Institutes of Public Administration (NIPA) at Karachi and Lahore, the Pakistan Academy of Rural Development at Peshawar (PARA), and the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC) at Lahore. Other services also had their own training institutions.

The training was conducted on a full-time basis, and usually scheduled when a person was in a career transition. NIPA and PARA training was designated for mid-level managers whereas the PASC serviced upper managers/executives. This latter institution was a residence facility which provided good amenities for its trainees.

In operating ethos the in-service training institutions reflected the bureaucratic and social segmentation inherent in Pakistani social life. The NIPAs were more egalitarian-oriented with their training programs crossing organizational and service lines, whereas the Administrative Staff College was an elitist institution designed for a small number of selected individuals.

At the time of independence, management education in Pakistan's institutions of higher learning did not exist. Hence there was an urgent need to remedy this deficiency. Basically, the NIPAs were established in the early 1960s to infuse American management principles and practices into Pakistan's public service. Hence, they may be regarded as institutions of organizational expediency. If Pakistan's institutions of higher education should ever develop quality programs in management, then the need for the NIPAs would be greatly diminished, with constructive on-the-job training programs established to meet specific program needs.³⁰ After three decades, this expectation has not been adequately met. The NIPAs have expanded in number to service the Peshawar and Quetta regions while on-the-job training programs remain poorly developed.

In contrast the PASC drew its inspiration from the British experience, namely its administrative staff college located at Henley-on-Thames. Trainees were heavily drawn from the Generalist and Financial Services. Its facilities reflect the status and prestige of the superior services, somewhat like those of the former CSA.

Unlike the NIPAs, the PASC gives priority attention to policy issues and analyses. Its organizational focus centers on the federal and provincial secretariats. It is not a remedial oriented institution but rather it seeks to equip its clientele to better understand evolving policy issues. In broad terms the NIPA programs are more oriented in how to get the "job done" and the PASC in how to determine the right job/direction. For both institutions the task is to rejuvenate selected civil servants by removing them from the daily demands of the workplace.

Employment Quotas and Ethnic Preference. Following the practice of the British Raj, recruitment to the middle and upper management levels was initially based upon the principle of merit — ascertained on the basis of written examinations, interviews, and in appropriate instances, individual performance records. Early in Pakistan's existence, the principle of merit was modified by reserving posts in both the federal and provincial government for special groups. Under the Bhutto regime, provision was made for lateral recruitment to posts within the central secretariat and elsewhere. One study shows that in 1980, only ten percent of the posts in the federal government were filled on the criteria of merit. The remaining 90 percent were distributed on weighted criteria of population of the provinces, tribal areas, and the federal area of Islamabad (Raheem and Husain 1980:324; Cf. Khan and Zafarullah 1984).

In the words of Professor Charles H. Kennedy (1984b:1), "Pakistan could be described as the archetypal quota state..."³¹ There evolved a complex system of regional and vested interest quotas for recruitment to federal and provincial governments and semi-autonomous government enterprises as a survival expediency, to ameliorate the divisive tendencies of ethnic diversity, substantial unequal regional development and imbalanced institutional growth and

development. These have since been extended to include student admission to educational institutions. Quotas have been set aside for representatives to legislative bodies. They are employed to (a) introduce remedial or compensatory measures for identified disadvantaged persons ranging from those of regional linguistic groups to children of widows and non-Muslim minorities, and (b) provide some measure of proportional representation ranging from linguistic regions to gender. In political practice, preferential quotas have become a form of patronage—providing through the political process a means to reward some groups and punish others. Under both the Bhutto and Zia regimes, political appointments, especially of a lateral character, were used to place in key positions persons who were sympathetic with the government's policies.

Vested groups such as the military, organized professionals, and sportsmen (mainly those athletes of reputation in field hockey and cricket), have managed through provisions of quota systems to secure special advantages for themselves along with their spouses and progeny.

Possibly quotas have reduced divisive tendencies and brought some measure of national integration. The sunk costs, however, were high. The most serious was the compromise of the merit principle, with its more than 100 years of history. Many exceptional young individuals were excluded from the public service: large numbers opted out of taking the recruitment examinations. Since 1977 the Federal Public Service Commission has found difficulty in filling vacancies at large by competitive examination. This situation has been exacerbated by the complexity of the personnel process which results in long delays in establishing eligibility for appointment and tendering of appointments. Sizeable amounts of scarce resource have been utilized to administer the complex quota system.

The system's operation reinforces the Pakistani's impression of widespread bureaucratic corruption, especially in the area of lateral appointment where competitive examination has either been bypassed or simplified. With lesser qualified persons appointed or promoted to key positions, morale in the civil service was affected.

While this personnel practice may have improved regional representation in the organs of government, it has reinforced invidious distinctions between the ethnic groups and regions.

The use of quotas and ethnic preference was conceived as a short-term measure by which to achieve greater employment equity and national commitment. Every body of public inquiry has recommended its elimination or at least phase-down. The contrary has occurred with quotas in themselves becoming vested rights, entitlements of a sort—spreading and deepening in bureaucratic practice.

A subject scarcely addressed in Pakistan's pragmatic search for public equity was the latent socio-religious issue of Islamic sectarianism. In the broader context of Sunni versus Shia orthodoxy, Pakistani leaders have managed to secure a surprising degree of equanimity. In the narrower context of Islamic sects, serious problems of divisiveness have surfaced.

A difficult problem emerges in the treatment of non-Islamic minorities. As Leonard Binder (1963:88 ff.) writes, the Koran and the Hadiths are clear that "an infidel should never exercise authority over a Muslim" (Koran 3:24, 5:56). Some kinds of minorities never fit. They are intolerable and insoluble. For Islam they are heretics. Reactions to such individuals and their followers historically have been quick and drastic. Those deviate socio-religious groups that survived have been reduced to a non-Muslim status, with a separate theology accessible only to their initiates. In the Middle East the Alawites and the Druze are prominent examples. The Bahais in Iran represent another anathema to traditional Islam. For India the Sikhs fall into this grouping.

By martial law provision issued on 26 April 1984, the controversial Ahmadi sect was designated as a non-Islamic religion. With this act, the government imposed draconian-like measures on the beliefs and practices of this socio-religious group (*jama'at*) (Jones 1987b:74-97; Kennedy and Jones 1989:103-32). Its leaders fled abroad to safe haven in Great Britain, in effect abandoning their once flourishing center at Rabawah located in the Punjab province.

A sense of tragedy prevails for this reformist Islamic sect. At the time of partition (1947) they opted to move from India to Pakistan, desiring to become part of the new Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Unlike their more orthodox members, the Ahmadis accepted Western education and produced a number of outstanding persons, including one Nobel prize winner in physics. They were attracted to public service including the military. Their successes brought resentment in the orthodox communities. Since the earliest days of Pakistan, Ahmadis have experienced violence, persecution and murder. Their position became increasingly tenuous under Zia's Islamization program. The state was increasingly being defined within the terms of Islamic fundamentalism. Conformity to belief and practice will be prescribed by government. Equity and social justice will be framed in new legal concepts, with the notion of equality being reinterpreted.

But one aspect did not change. The government sought to pursue equity through its conventional systems of quotas and ethnic preference. While the Ahmadi population numbers three or more million, the government records only 63,675 Ahmadis. One seat was reserved for the Ahmadis in the National Assembly. The Ahmadis are now *kafirs* (infidels), which means they are simply non-persons. They can never be elevated to full citizenship. As one Muslim scholar writes: "Neither the Bahais nor the Ahmadis can exist without being

persecuted under a Sunni or Shia state. Their salvation under contemporary politics lies in achieving a separate state of their own" (Letter dated 18 September 1985).

Staffing Key Positions: Technocrats and Generalists. No aspect of public organization is so difficult to resolve as the working relationships between the specialist/technocrats and the generalist/managers.³² While this applies to all levels and components of organizations, it is especially nagging at the strategic apex where technical expertise of productive work to be performed must mesh into the capacity to resolve competing political demands (Mintzberg 1983:Chapter 1).

Management as a legitimate subject and discipline is basically a late 19th and early 20th century American product. It emerged as a consequence of accelerated industrialization and urbanization which required large scale, complex organizations. There are essentially no management problems in agrarian societies such as at the time of the British Raj. There are, however, a lot of political problems in the Laswellian sense of who gets what, how, when, where. Hence administrative politics takes on inordinate importance since this is the way where the "most" is to be "gotten."

With the emergence of the administrative state, the purview of government expanded to include the production of goods and services. Its technical operating core was transformed (Jones 1985:55-83). Managing the technical core of the new transformed organizations must primarily be the responsibility of technocrats and not generalists. For Pakistan this has not typically been the case. From hospitals to electrical power plants, generalists in civil service rank have dominated the strategic apex of many technically driven organizations.

In the disturbances of 1968-69 the technocrats, mainly physicians and engineers, openly contested their subordinate position to the generalists. During the Bhutto reforms in 1973 they fought for more reserved posts in the central and provincial secretariats and the strategic apex of large public enterprises. A decade later in the 1980s they were again agitating for greater recognition (Kennedy 1983:98-121; 1987:Chapter 7).

Under Pakistan's administrative state which was heavily funded with foreign aid, a case could be made that the strategic importance of the technocrats had greatly increased. To manage Pakistan's hydraulic system, the largest irrigation system in the world, takes persons educated and trained in extraordinary technical expertise. Generalists cannot adequately perform these functions.

While in recent years improved accommodation between technocrats and generalists has been reached, the issue is far from being resolved. Most jobs in bureaucracy have both their technical and political dimensions. In most

organizations the technical consideration is inversely related to echelon level. The higher the echelon level, the lower the importance of technical factors in contrast to the political factors. This fact is structured into Pakistan's bureaucracy with its secretariat system which could be one of its strengths.

The issue of technical versus political management is complicated by the extreme difficulty in preparing and securing political managers. In other words: "Can political management be taught?" There is no question about technical management. It can be taught. Found here is the so-called difference between soft science against hard science. Political management falls into the former and not the latter category. At best it represents a form of distilled wisdom gained out of meaningful experience.

Of these two contending aspects, quality political management is more critical because through its policy process, it determines the feasible. In contrast, technical management is concerned with carrying out the detailed activities of projects/programs. Here is found the delicate problem of management of means against management of ends which requires the accommodation of two different kinds of mind-sets.

Administrative reform in Pakistan never basically confronted this vital issue. Possibly it was never mentioned since official reports dealt more with mundane rather than theoretical aspects of its bureaucracy. The basic four substances of the administrative state, as earlier discussed, were never molded into new wholes. Admitting a few technocrats into a few strategic positions in an establishmentarian system was not the appropriate means by which to mobilize meaningful science and technology in vital government operations. Rank based on technically designed jobs is the only way to insure that technical skills and knowledge may be infused and utilized properly in technologically driven organizations. This requirement means that Pakistan will have to revise and revamp its entire educational establishment, recruitment examination and promotion system, and career patterns. It must as well take a hard look at its society.

In addition, technocrats in their mid-career would have to be converted into political managers rather than generalists in their early careers forced into technocratic molds. In the 1960s, U.S. technical assistance offered a solution to this critical matter which was summarily rejected (Bower 1983). Instead Pakistan sought to pursue a practice of expediency where a few technical-type civil servants would be appointed to secretariat and upper management posts — in effect maintaining the status quo.

Lateral Recruitment and Movement. Opening up the bureaucracy to lateral recruitment and movement was a major feature of Bhutto's administrative reform (Kennedy 1987:Chapter 6). In August 1973 lateral recruits were appointed to the

revised service structure with its newly created occupational groups. Over the next five years a total of 514 lateral appointments were made, with the majority drawn from within the government. Of these appointments, 48 military officers were laterally recruited.

From its inception this program encountered problems, with the Establishment Division finding it difficult to place the new lateral recruits. Under the subsequent Zia regime lateral recruitment was early curtailed and finally abandoned.

With its cadre system and dominance by the generalists, it was inevitable that this program would fail. Yet its process was accelerated by compromise in the merit principle and the appointment of many persons with marginal qualifications. Training programs to transform technocrats into political managers were never initiated, since this is not a feature of Pakistan's career development. Technocrats who reach strategic positions remain few in number.

With the secretariat system intact, it was virtually impossible for lateral recruitment such as in the United States to take place at the strategic apex level of management. Ministers and related political officials continued to draw their staffs from career civil servants who operate as politicians for hire.

Bhutto's notion of the need to infuse "new blood" in the personnel system had merit. Pakistan could not find a way to accomplish it without seriously weakening the civil service.

The Unified National Pay Scale. A major contention in the 1968-69 disturbances was the complexity and wide variance in the compensation of the cadres and classes of employees. As part of the service structure revision, the Bhutto administrative reform introduced the Unified National Pay Scale (Kennedy 1981:78-100 and A.I. Hussain 1987:139-48). Supposedly, the 600-odd pay scales were replaced by a pay scale of 22 grades. In design this scale had much in common with the U.S. federal government's General Schedule, which was studied by Pakistani reformers. Bhutto's 1973 guidelines for reform provided that "the correct grading for each post would be determined by job evaluation" (Hussain 1987:139).

In Pakistan's administrative reform, the implementation of the National Pay Scale was a major accomplishment. It rationalized to some degree the pay structure of government. The extraordinary complexity of the former system was reduced but it was not eliminated. In some ways, it made the service structure more egalitarian by narrowing the gap between the highest and the lowest paid public employee. It introduced pay comparability between the services.

In spite of these positive aspects, the reform avoided several critical issues. Special pay allowances for certain occupations such as teachers, lateral recruits,

physicians, and technical personnel were introduced. Left intact for the more prestigious services were special provisions for housing, local compensation, senior postings, and travel allowances.

Product of Another Age

Pakistan's personnel system is a product of another time, another age. It is much studied, remains controversial, and is inadequately understood.

Since Pakistan's earliest days measures have been introduced for its improvement. Basically, they may be characterized as emotionally charged expediciencies to deal with crises of the moment. Pakistani policymakers have resisted systematic social and organizational differentiation of their administrative state. They have sought to maintain the *status quo* while at the same time imposing on the administrative state heavy socioeconomic burdens of development. Its organizational structure is fused in the sense that social, economic and political activities are heavily vested in the government bureaucracy. This situation will continue as long as the market principle remains poorly understood and private business is suspect. With growing Islamization, the issue arises: Can Pakistan adequately develop a healthy market economy? The quest for an answer goes beyond the purpose of this examination except to conclude that Pakistan's personnel system will remain entrapped in another age until a new configuration of economic forces brings about socio-transformation. With such a transformation there may arise a more constructive form of dynamic conservatism.

General Summary and Conclusion

A contradiction exists when Pakistan's public personnel administration is examined against its nearly 200-year history (1793-1993). At the time of the partition of the Indian subcontinent (1947), the Indian Civil Service (ICS) was deemed one of the finest of its kind ever established. It was instrumental in providing unified rule over the entire subcontinent, a historical accomplishment never before achieved and not feasible now. It introduced a fair measure of order and justice and progress based on a body of equitable law and sound principles of public administration.

Pakistan inherited that proud legacy which now in the popular and scholarly commentaries is deemed almost a "curse." This was unfortunate because history is always prologue.

Pakistan's reform efforts have been based upon disjointed understanding of history, inadequate theoretical underpinnings, and ineffective coordination of

initiatives. The issue of an inefficient and ineffective public service should not have been narrowly conceived as administrative reform in which personnel administration was a major constituent but should have rather been broadly interpreted as institutional reform in which organization was the major constituent.

Such a contextual approach would have required Pakistan's principal decisionmakers to address pathological ills stemming from extreme socio-organizational segmentation and excessive narcissistic behavior. Parochialism in its worst forms of rampant sectarianism and communalism could have been better understood, and politically confined.

But it must be recognized that Pakistan survives, and not by accident. Pakistan's inherited imperial tradition served to bond together a fragile polity. Its basic governance institutions have withstood unscrupulous politicians and vindictive groups. Bureaucrats within the Indian Civil Service (ICS) ethos stood up against corrupt and incompetent politicians. They have brought rationalistic and technocratic outlook in the conduct of public affairs. They have sought to overpower the myriad of forces of irrationality. Assailed and attacked, the bureaucracy to this day remains the best depository of intellectual talent and public wisdom. It has a large number of doctorates from British, Canadian, United States and other foreign universities. Unlike most countries including the United States, Pakistan's public servants publish books and quote poetry. They give speeches and teach at the nation's complex of training institutions. They are proficient in several languages.

This small class of upper civil servants have sorely been "whip-lashed." This should not be surprising since they basically functioned not as public managers but as politicians. In some ways they could be perceived as professional mercenaries within Machiavellian terms.

Missing in the new situation of independence was clear-cut authority/mandate to act. Under the British Raj authority to act was vested in the Crown, although at times its legitimacy was questioned by Indian subjects. Nevertheless, the ISCers were his/her Majesty's civil servants. Autocratic tendencies were tempered by powerful oversight institutions. Parliament could, and did, address wrongs. A powerful free press both in India and Great Britain quickly spoke out against perceived bureaucratic mismanagement and injustices. A strong judiciary evolved which showed will and independence in resolution of autocratic conduct in the bureaucracy. Then there were the countless forums found in British universities, private associations, missionary churches and intellectual salons that with no hesitation debated timely issues facing imperial India. The civil service could not escape the leveling consequences of public opinion.

With Pakistan's independence, except for the judiciary, most of this sort of institutional oversight vanished. Under such circumstances Lord Acton was right. Even good and intellectual men can be corrupted. This progress accelerates when too much of the national resource falls under control of the administrative state.

Pakistan faces a critical juncture as to what sort of political economy it wishes to develop. Until this issue is resolved, personnel improvement as part of administrative reform in the larger context of institutional development remains fraught with insuperable problems. Such as with the past, no significant organizational transformation will take place. Expedient modifications will be introduced to shore up an "incomplete" personnel system which never quite moves out of the realm of crisis management. In form it will be segmented into a larger segmented administrative system. It will not be open and subject to evolutionary growth and development. As with the past there will be periodic rebellions but no revolution. Merit will increasingly be downplayed, with ascriptive supplanting prescriptive criteria. Rewards will continue to be uneven, making it difficult to motivate personnel—especially at the lower echelons. Excessive careerism will continue, with job protection paramount. Ideals and rewards for truly serving the public will remain ambiguous. Changes in the system will be mainly mechanical in nature, stressing technique over substance.

What Pakistan sorely needs are countervailing influences generated out of a growing pluralism of universities, public policy centers, voluntary associations, civic groups, business enterprises, religious bodies; all of which contribute to the making of dynamic and responsible government. The lesson drawn out of the Pakistan experience is that the change centering alone on the personnel system will not effect any meaningful improvement in the conduct of administrative affairs. Without meaningful political reform there can be no meaningful administrative reform. The old and traditional ways of conducting the public business will continue. Ideas for their reform will be put forth, clash with convention and dissipate. Change will be of a gradual nature, with the old system moving slowly into a new set of social niches. Narcissistic behavior will be commonplace, possibly tempered by an ethos of intellectualism. Segmented social life undoubtedly will be complicated by new strands arising out of Pakistan's accelerated industrial development and emergent urbanization. All the segmented entities will take on more Islamic character which may over time have a social leveling effect.

In the terms of Hofstede, the society will remain characterized by social collectivism which fosters strong loyalty to ethnic group and region. Individuals will be profoundly shaped by the narcissism generated out of admiring followers. With the growing Islamization, charisma may become more prevalent.

The high power distance with its vast social inequalities will continue. Title, rank and status will carry great importance.

Continued belief in *kismet* or Islamic fate will be evidenced. Pakistan is a fatalistic society. Pakistanis will continue as low risk takers, with the upper bureaucracy given inordinate power and responsibility. There will be little mobility into and out of the civil service. The overwhelming number of public employees will be recruited before the age of 30 years—spending all of their productive years in the bureaucracy.

The upper bureaucracy will continue to be characterized by excessive formal rules, with measures to provide security and reduce individual risk.

Qualities of masculinity, now already dominant, with growing Islamization will take on greater significance. The roles between men and women will continue to be sharply defined.

While merit in recent times has greatly been compromised, the upper bureaucracy will retain its generalist tradition with a strong intellectual bent. It represents Pakistan's best hope for change, especially if society becomes more liberalized by market forces generated by increased pluralism and softening of social segmentation.

But then who can say for sure? As ancient Greeks taught, only the Gods can see the future; mere mortals live in the present. Wise men may know things about to occur.³³ Just possibly with its now 40 years of intellectual clashing of ideas, Pakistan will soon articulate a new form of personnel management more fitting for its developmentalistic age.

Endnotes

¹Published by Viking Press of New York. For an insightful book review, see Ghazala Firdous Hashmi, *Journal of Third World Studies*, 8 (Spring 1991), pp. 279-83.

²See Chowhury Rehmat Ali, *Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 225. "Pakistan is both a Persian and Hindu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands - Indian and Asian. That is Punjab, Afghanistan (North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kutch and Kathiawar), Turkharistan, Afghanistan and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks - the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and ethnic stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original fatherland."

³Only one such community decided to locate in Pakistan, the Ahmadi sect. This reformist group has suffered under Pakistani rule. See Garth N. Jones, "Equity in Pakistan's Public Service: The Ahmadiyah Issue," *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, 9 (June 1987), pp. 74-97.

⁴Charles H. Kennedy, a leading scholar on this subject, notes that: "A conservative estimate of the number of 'officially-sanctioned' reports ... issued between 1947 and 1978 comes to forty-four documents with a combined length of 7,441 pages, excluding appendices. (Some) 459 people... served as full members of committees..." See his "Policy Formulation in Pakistan: Antecedents to Bhutto's Administrative Reforms," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 21 (March 1982), pp. 42-56. In addition there were studies undertaken by each major regime—Ayub, Bhutto, and Zia.

⁸The term "state" is used as suggested by Gabriel A. Almond, "The Return to the State," *American Political Science Review*, 82 (September 1988), pp. 855-74, and James W. Fester, "The State and Its Study of the Whole and the Parts," (PS) *Political Science and Politics*, 21 (Fall 1988), pp. 891-901. Within its application in the scholarship on development administration, see Garth N. Jones, "In the Search of History: Great Expectations of Development Administration, A Personal Memoir with Apologies to Theodore H. White and Charles Dickens," *Pakistan Administration: A Journal of the Pakistan Administrative Staff College* (Lahore), 27 (January-June 1990), especially pp. 24-26.

⁹In Pakistan this is powerfully expressed by Sir Muhammad Iqbal in his philosophical poem, *The Mysteries of Selflessness*, especially in his first line—"you who were made by God to be the seal..." See translated, with preface and notes by A.J. Arberry, and published (1953) by John Murray in London. Cf. Louay M. Safi, "The Islamic State: A Conceptual Framework," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Science*, 8 (September 1991), pp. 221-34, and Judith D. Toland (ed.), *Ethnicity and the State*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1992).

¹⁰Ralph Braibanti has exhaustively treated this heritage for Pakistan. His major articles were conveniently brought together in Jameelur Rehman Khan (ed.), *Evolution of Pakistan's Administrative System* (Islamabad: Pakistan Public Administration Centre, 1987). Particularly insightful is Braibanti's, "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 24 (Spring 1959), pp. 258-304. Also see his pioneer work, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966). This expectation is well stated by Maurice Zinkin, *Development of Free Asia* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1986), Chapter 10 "The Role of the Bureaucrat." As to its specifics in terms of personnel management, see Public Administration Branch, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Handbook of Civil Service Laws and Practices* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1966). Cf. Albert Lepawsky (ed.), *Administration: The Art and Science of Organization and Management* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 11 and Garth N. Jones, "Rise and Fall of a Professional Ideal: Particulars Concerning Public Administration," *American Review of Public Administration*, 16 (Winter 1983), pp. 305-19.

¹¹It is somewhat ironic that both of these supposedly economic innovations were championed by U.S. donors, mainly the U.S. Agency for International Development and Ford Foundation in a contract to Harvard University, whereas in the United States such introductions would be considered anathemas. For one study, see Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968). For more study on public enterprise, see Robert La Porte, Jr., and Muntazar Bashir Ahmed, *Public Enterprise in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in Economic Development* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989).

¹²The 1960 thought and studies on this score now appear appropriate. For illustration, see Douglas E. Ashford, *National Development and Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967); Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, three volumes (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968); Fred W. Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), especially Ralph Braibanti's Chapter 6, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth," and Albert Gorvine, "Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change," in Guthrie Birkhead (ed.), *Administrative Problems in Pakistan* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 185-212.

¹³In his insightful article on Pakistan's efforts of administrative reform, Nasir Islam uses the term "pillars" to describe the same phenomenon. I find this useful but the imagery is structurally limited. Thus I prefer the term "substances" which can be literally molded into various institutional forms. See Islam's "Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform and Politics: Pakistan 1947-87," *Public Administration and Development*, 9 (June/August, 1989), pp. 271-85.

¹⁴Under Pakistan's central planning some attention was given to this matter but with little success. See George M. Platt, "Subnational Government in Pakistan: Determinants of Growth," *Pakistan Administrative Staff College Quarterly*, 5 (March/June 1967), pp. 1-12; Garth N. Jones and Shafik H. Hashmi (eds.), *Problems of Urbanization in Pakistan* (Karachi: National Institute of Public

Administration, 1967); Cf. Shaukat Ali and Malik Muhammad Siddiq, *Municipal Administration in West Pakistan: A Survey of Its Evolution, Organization, Processes and Problems* (Lahore: Provincial Local Government Board, 1970); and S. Shahid Ali Rizvi, *Local Government in Pakistan* (Karachi: Centre for Research in Local Government, 1980); and Inayatullah, "Local Administration in a Developing Country: The Pakistan Case," in Edward W. Weidner (ed.), *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979), pp. 277-308.

¹²Pakistanis have published a great deal on its problems of corruption. One of the more revealing pieces was published over 25 years ago. See M. Masihuzzaman, "Thoughts on Some Aspects of Corruption," *NIPA Reporter* (Karachi), 4 (December 1965), pp. 265-96. Cf. Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption," *Public Administration* (London), 40 (Winter 1963), pp. 357-72.

¹³For a detailed discussion, although slightly dated, see Masihuz-Zaman, "How Pakistan is governed," *Pakistan Quarterly* (Karachi), 13 (Autumn/Winter 1965), pp. 90-95 and 124-27.

¹⁴Although slightly dated, the following remains an insightful discussion—Faqr Muhammad, "Function and Structure of Government in Pakistan," in M.A. Kasmi (ed.), *Reflections on Public Administration in Pakistan* (Lahore: Civil Service Academy, 1963), pp. 114-67.

¹⁵The literature of the subject is literally overwhelming. Insightful is Islam's "Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform and Politics: Pakistan 1947-87," *Public Administration and Development*, 9 (June/August 1989), pp. 271-85. As to early explanation on Pakistan, see Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption," *Public Administration* (London), 40 (Winter 1962), pp. 357-62.

¹⁶For a knowledgeable novelist's insights, see Paul Scott's *Raj Quartet*, especially those narratives on the British-Indian Army. Published by Avon Books in 1979—*The Jewel in the Crown*, *The Day of the Scorpion*, *The Towers of Silence*, and *A Division of Spoils*. Because of the Muslim role in the 1857 Indian Mutiny, the British Raj never established a separate Islamic military unit.

¹⁷I am unaware of any empirical research on this subject. However, former Pakistani associates informed me that murder of father and/or son is not uncommon, such as was the case of Nawab Kalabagh, Governor of West Pakistan under Ayub Khan and one of his principal political lieutenants. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's childhood gives credence to the pervasiveness of narcissistic behavior in Pakistan. See Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-72* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), especially pp. 83-90. For a pioneer work touching upon this aspect, see Muneer Ahmad, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964).

¹⁸See Karl von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton, University Press, 1964); Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967); Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967) and *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan, 1962-1969* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-59* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971); Craig Baxter (ed.), *Politics in Pakistan: The Stability of the Zia Regime* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1988); Craig Baxter, Charles H. Kennedy, Yogendra Malik and Robert Oberst, *Government and Politics in South Asia* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987); Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of the State* (London: Penguin Publishers, 1983); and Shafik H. Hashmi (ed.), *The Governing Process in Pakistan, 1958-69* (Lahore, Pakistan: Aziz Publishers, 1987).

¹⁹The following two articles provide summaries of Pakistan's troubled past—Wayne Wilcox, "Political Change in Pakistan: Structures, Functions, Constraints and Goals," *Pacific Affairs*, 41 (Fall 1968), pp. 341-54, and Lawrence Ziring, "The Roots of Political Instability in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 9 (Fall/Winter 1987), pp. 52-72. Also see W. Howard Wriggins (ed.), *Pakistan in Transition* (Islamabad: Islamabad University Press, 1975); Lawrence Ziring and others, *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (London: Dawson Press, 1980) and his "Pakistan's Nationalities Dilemma: Domestic and International Implications" in

Ziring (ed.), *The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), pp. 212 *et seq.*

²⁰From 1967 to late 1969 I was Chief of the US/AID Public Administration Division in Pakistan where I made a major effort to introduce improved personnel practices into the Pakistan government. Among the initiatives was securing the services of two "short termers," Robert Abramson and O. Glenn Stahl. Both individuals submitted excellent reports. See Abramson, "Public Administration Training and Personnel Management Reform in Pakistan," Contract No. AID/nesa-437, 28 August 1969 (mimeographed) and Stahl, "A Demonstration Approach to Career Management, A Proposal to the Establishment Division....," February 1971 (mimeographed). In addition under a US/AID contract with the University of Southern California (1961-68), training and education initiatives were carried out to strengthen personnel management. In the 1970s, US/AID largely withdrew from any technical assistance in public administration, especially in the personnel area. Although never given adequate assessment and evaluation, these efforts essentially failed—never receiving support from either the Pakistani or the U.S. governments. My frustrations, including several publications, is fairly well summed up in Jones, "In Search of History....," 1990.

Also see B.A. Abbas, *Experience of Major Administrative Reforms for Development*, a paper presented to the Ecafe Seminar in Bangkok, 24th June to 1st July 1969 (Bangkok: United Nations, 1969); and Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Resistance to Change: Failure of Administrative Reform Efforts in the Civil Service of Pakistan," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1976.

²¹Cf. an insightful undated piece (1968?) by B.A. Abbas, "Open letter to CSP Probationers," (mimeograph) which is found in my personal files. Abbas, a CSP, could foresee the oncoming attacks against the bureaucracy and urged progressive reforms. Illustrative of the rejection of major reform are two proposals made by US/AID short termers O. Glenn Stahl on career management submitted to the Establishment Division February 1971 and January 1974 (mimeographed) which are in my files.

²²Neither did the subsequent Zia government seek to modify this organization in any substantial way.

²³An edited version is found in *Journal of Rural Development and Administration* (Peshawari), 6 (October/December 1968), pp. 79-85.

²⁴This is based on my personal observation as Chief of the US/AID Public Administration Division 1967-69 and subsequent discussions with former Pakistani students at the East West Center, Hawaii 1969-70, and the United Nations, New York, 1972-73.

²⁵Attention should be called that the British government was reforming its civil service during the same time period. Pakistan reformers were aware of this undertaking and studied closely its official reports as well as scholarly articles. See Chairman Lord Fulton, *The Civil Service: Report of the Committee, 1968*, Volumes I-III (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1968). As to pertinent scholarly articles, see Patrick Lynch, "The Fulton Report-I," *Administration Journal of the Institute of Public Administration of Ireland*, 16 (Autumn 1968), pp. 213-37; J.F. Robertson, "Civil Service Reform in Britain," *New Zealand Journal of Administration*, 31 (September 1968), pp. 83-100; B.K. Day, "The Fulton Report, Some Comments," *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, 14 (October/December 1968), pp. 962-93; and the complete issue, *Public Administration* (London), 47 (Spring 1969), with William Armstrong, "The Fulton Report 1, The Tasks of the Civil Service," pp. 33-47, and "The Fulton Report: Accountable Management in the Civil Service," pp. 49-63; and R.G.S. Brown, "Fulton and Morale," *Public Administration* (London), 49 (Summer 1971), pp. 83-96. Cf. Mian Anwer Ali, "The Emergence of the ICS-III, More Power for D.M. After 1955," *The Pakistan Times*, 20 October 1968, Magazine Section, pp. 1-3.

²⁶For specific details on Pakistan, see Nasir Islam, "Historical Introduction: The Persisting Colonial Legacy," in V. Subramanian (ed.), *Public Administration in the Third World* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 68-101. India and Bangladesh also seem to follow the Pakistan

experience. See Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Politics of Administrative Reform and Reorganization in Bangladesh," *Public Administration and Development*, 7 (October/December 1989), pp. 51-62; Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Resistance to Administrative Reform in Bangladesh, 1972-1987," *Public Administration and Development*, 9 (June/August 1989), pp. 301-14; A.T.M. Obaidullah, "Problem of Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh: Institutionalization of Bureaucracy," *Asian Profile*, 19 (February 1991), pp. 39-60, and O.P. Dwivedi, R.B. Jain and B.D. Dua, "Imperial Legacy, Bureaucracy, and Administrative Changes: India 1947-1987," *Public Administration and Development*, 9 (June/August 1989), pp. 253-269.

²⁷As chief of the Public Administration Division/US-AID Pakistan (1967-69), several ranking CSP officers contacted me about the possibilities of a technical assistance project to strengthen managerial and technical competencies in the Service. Subsequently, steps were initiated to reform the service somewhat in the terms of the new Executive Service in the United States. This project proposal encountered considerable opposition in US/AID Washington. After my departure in August 1969 AID/W basically "killed" it. Hostilities in the U.S. aid agency toward the CSP appeared to me to be as intense as for certain Bhutto groups.

²⁸More complete details are contained in Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, 1980.

²⁹Pakistanis have published a great deal about their training institutions, especially in the 1960s and early 1970s. An insightful observation was never published. It was written by M.B.A. Abbas, CSP, when he was a Senior Specialist at the East West Center. See his *Public Administration Training in Pakistan: A Retrospect and An Outlook for the Future*, prepared for the Second International Conference on the Problems of Modernization in Asia and the Pacific, 9-15 August 1970, Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 1970 (mimeographed). For detailed descriptions of this period, see Md. Anis-u-zaman (ed.), *Training for Public Service* (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1969).

³⁰This was the underlying rationale of the 1960s US/AID contract with the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California.

³¹Kennedy is the preeminent scholar on this subject. This section relies heavily upon his published works. See his *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*, 1987, especially Chapter 8, "The Quota System of Regional Representation in the Federal Bureaucracy;" Chapter 3, "Policies of Redistributive Preference in Pakistan," in Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy (eds.), *Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986); "Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 24 (June 1984), pp. 688-703; and "Analysis of the Lateral Recruitment Program to the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan, 1973-79," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 3 (Summer 1980), pp. 42-65.

³²To simplify matters, the terms managers and administrators are used interchangeably.

³³See Philostratos in *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*. The source of this notion is found in Timothy Byrne, "Technology and the Imaginative Encounter of Tradition," *The Intercollegiate Review*, 28 (Fall 1992), p. 25.

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